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ABSTRACT: The EBM+ programme is an attempt to improve the way in which present-day eviden-
ce-based medicine (EBM) assesses causal claims: according to EBM+, mechanistic studies should be scru-
tinised alongside association studies. This paper addresses two worries about EBM+: (i) that it is not fea-
sible in practice, and (ii) that it is too malleable, i.e., its results depend on subjective choices that need to 
be made in order to implement the procedure. Several responses to these two worries are considered and 
evaluated. The paper also discusses the question of whether we should have confidence in medical inter-
ventions, in the light of Stegenga’s arguments for medical nihilism.
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RESUMEN: El programa EBM+ es un intento de mejorar la manera en la que la medicina basada en 
la evidencia (EBM) actual evalúa enunciados causales: de acuerdo con EBM+, hay que considerar estudios 
mecanísticos junto con estudios asociativos. Este artículo aborda dos problemas a los que se enfrenta EBM+: 
(i) que no es viable en la práctica, y (ii) que es demasiado maleable, i.e. sus resultados dependen de elecciones 
subjetivas necesarias para implementar el procedimiento. Se examinan y evalúan varias respuestas a estos pro-
blemas. El artículo también discute la cuestión de si deberíamos tener confianza en las intervenciones médicas, 
a la luz de los argumentos de Stegenga a favor del nihilismo médico.
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1. EBM and EBM+
Causal claims are central to medicine. All areas of medicine seek to establish such claims: in 
basic medical science, claims about disease progression and the maintenance of health; in 
exposure assessment, claims about the effects of exposure to chemicals or other agents; in 
intervention assessment, claims about the effects of health interventions, for example. The 
idea underlying evidence-based medicine (EBM) is to make the evidence for these causal 
claims explicit, and to make methods for evaluating that evidence explicit, in order to im-
prove the reliability of the assessment of causal claims:
Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evi-
dence. (Sackett et al., 1996, p. 71)
However, the way EBM seeks to achieve this goal is by focussing on clinical studies— par-
ticularly randomised controlled studies (RCTs)—and by excluding other kinds of evidence 
or by viewing it as inherently low quality:
Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and 
pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical decision making and stresses the ex-
amination of evidence from clinical research. (Guyatt et al., 1992, p. 2420)
The exclusion of ‘pathophysiologic rationale’—more generally, of mechanistic evidence— 
conflicts with a recent line of research on the epistemology of causality. Russo and Wil-
liamson (2007) argued that to establish a causal claim in the health sciences one should 
look for evidence of mechanisms as well as evidence of correlation. This is because there are 
many possible explanations of an observed correlation between variables A and B: one such 
explanation is that A is a cause of B, but others are reverse causation, confounding, chance, 
or other relationships between A and B, such as semantic, constitutive, logical, physical and 
mathematical relationships (Williamson, 2019a, §1.2). What is distinctive about the for-
mer, causal, explanation is that there is some mechanism complex linking A to B by which 
instances of A explain instances of B and which gives rise to the observed correlation. 
Hence evidence of mechanisms is crucial to establishing causality.
Fig. 1 provides a visual representation of this epistemology of causality. Association 
studies are studies which test for an association between A and B; these include both ex-
perimental and observational studies and encompass studies in clinical medicine as well as 
epidemiological studies of disease, and systematic reviews and meta-analyses of such stud-
ies. Association studies usually test whether A and B are probabilistically dependent, con-
ditional on other potential causes of B. Such studies provide direct evidence of a correla-
tion via the confirmatory channel C1. Within the class of association studies, RCTs are 
prized by proponents of present-day EBM because they can reduce the risk of confounding 
by unforeseen causes of B, so they can provide some indirect evidence of the existence of a 
mechanism of action (C2). A more direct way of confirming the presence of a mechanism 
of action is by confirming specific mechanism hypotheses, which posit features of a possible 
mechanism complex linking A and B (M2). Mechanistic studies test these hypotheses (M1). 
In some cases, established specific mechanism hypotheses can also confirm or undermine 
the presence of a posited correlation (M3)—see Williamson (2019a, §2.2) on this point.
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Figure 1
Evidential relationships for establishing a causal claim  
(Williamson, 2018)
This approach, then, motivates the systematic evaluation of mechanistic studies 
alongside association studies when assessing a causal claim in medicine. Parkkinen et  al. 
(2018) provide a set of general procedures for performing this evaluation and call this ap-
proach ‘EBM+’. Although EBM+ very much fits the spirit of EBM, because it seeks to 
make evidence and its evaluation explicit and systematic, it flies in the face of the actual 
practice of present-day EBM, which, as we have seen, devalues mechanistic studies. Park-
kinen et  al. (2018) view present-day EBM as a first approximation to correct evidence 
evaluation, with the scrutiny of mechanistic studies a further step along the path—hence 
the ‘+’ in ‘EBM+’. Note that EBM+ is intended to be applicable throughout medicine, 
which is broadly construed to include the health sciences as well as clinical practice, be-
cause it is based on a general thesis about how to establish causal claims. While Fig. 1 de-
picts evidential relations when assessing causation in a target population, the EBM+ pro-
gramme also has a set of procedures for assessing whether claims based on studies carried 
out on a different source population can be extrapolated to the target population (Parkki-
nen et al., 2018).
The above view of the epistemology of causality has been the object of some contro-
versy in the literature (see Williamson, 2019a, §1), and there are many who continue to 
agree with Guyatt et  al. (1992) that mechanistic evidence should be ‘de-emphasized’ or 
ignored. For example, the Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine still (as of 2021) 
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places mechanism-based reasoning at the bottom of its evidence hierarchy (OCEBM Levels 
of Evidence Working Group, 2011), and Miriam Solomon holds that
Mechanistic reasoning (or “mechanistic evidence”) does not play a role in the process of eval-
uating the effectiveness of new interventions. (Solomon, 2015, p. 132)
We will not revisit the rationale behind EBM+ in this paper, as it has been widely discussed 
elsewhere.1 Instead we will focus on two new challenges for EBM+. One worry is that the 
systematic consideration of mechanistic studies may simply not be feasible—a worry that 
we consider in §2. Another concern is that EBM+ may be prone to manipulation by sub-
jective influences, which we consider in §3. Finally, in §4, we discuss some consequences of 
our findings for Jacob Stegenga’s claim that one should have little confidence in the effec-
tiveness of medical interventions.
2. The feasibility of EBM+
One question that immediately faces the EBM+ programme is its feasibility. It is hard 
enough to systematically assess association studies, which are well indexed in databases and 
which are amenable to standardised statistical analysis. Mechanistic studies, however, are 
very heterogeneous and are not in general well indexed. Is it really practical to systemati-
cally evaluate mechanistic studies alongside association studies?2
The obvious way to meet this feasibility challenge is to provide a good example of evi-
dence assessment in medicine that appeals to EBM+ or something like it and that is clearly 
feasible. In this section we shall investigate whether such an example is to be found and, if 
so, where it is to be found.
Intervention assessment
It turns out that there are very few examples of the systematic and explicit evaluation of 
mechanistic evidence when assessing claims about the effectiveness of interventions.
One potential example is the umbrella review (i.e., review of systematic reviews and 
meta-analyses) of Posadzki et al. (2018), who assess effects of melatonin on health. They 
consider mechanistic evidence alongside association studies and formulate and evaluate 
specific mechanism hypotheses. However, their review of mechanism hypotheses is limited 
to the goal of identifying potential mechanisms of action; they do not integrate the con-
clusions of their analysis of the mechanism hypotheses with the results of their analysis of 
association studies in order to come up with an assessment of the causal claim based on all 
the evidence. Thus this study cannot be said to implement the EBM+ approach in its en-
1 See Williamson (2019a, §1) for references. The EBM+ programme is very much in line with the ef-
forts of Cartwright and Hardie (2012) to improve evidence evaluation in evidence-based policy.
2 Howick (2011, §10.4), for example, expresses doubts about feasibility on the grounds that mechanis-
tic evidence is usually too incomplete, or the mechanisms themselves too complex, to be able to use-
fully consider mechanistic evidence. La Caze (2019, §3.2) also presents a feasibility-related challenge, 
namely that of spelling out how evidence of complex mechanisms can inform extrapolation inferences.
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tirety. Nevertheless, they show that it is feasible to perform a systematic review in order to 
identify a range of specific mechanism hypotheses, which is an important component of 
the EBM+ programme.
Another potential example is the assessment of a pegylated combination therapy of 
peginterferon alfa and ribavirin for the treatment of chronic Hepatitis C, which led to its 
recommendation as the optimal treatment. Auker-Howlett and Wilde (2019) show that 
the reasoning that justified this recommendation can only be understood by means of the 
conceptual apparatus of Fig. 1. This is because neither association studies on their own nor 
mechanistic studies on their own provided grounds for the recommendation: only when as-
sociation and mechanistic studies are considered in combination with one another is the 
recommendation warranted. While their argument is compelling, it shows only that one 
needs the conceptual apparatus of EBM+ in order to account for intervention assessment 
here—it does not show that the detailed procedural recommendations of EBM+ are feasi-
ble. This is because the UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), who 
issued the recommendation about the treatment, cited only association studies in support 
of their recommendation (NICE, 2010), in accordance with EBM procedure but not with 
EBM+ procedure.3 (Given the arguments of Auker-Howlett and Wilde (2019), the associ-
ation studies on their own should not have been taken to establish effectiveness, and EBM+ 
procedure would have recommended a review of mechanistic studies on this occasion.) 
Thus, we must search elsewhere for evidence of the feasibility of the full EBM+ programme.
Table 1. The causal indicators of Hill (1965)
Strength Strength of the observed association
Consistency Consistency of the observed association
Specificity A narrowly defined cause and effect (disease), and the cause is not associated with other diseases
Temporality The putative cause occurs before early stages of the disease
Biological gradient A dose-response curve
Plausibility Plausible given the biological knowledge of the day
Coherence No conflict with the known history and biology of the disease
Experiment Confirming experimental evidence
Analogy Similar effects of similar causes
Disease assessment
Mechanistic evidence is routinely considered in disease assessment: there is often some in-
tegration of mechanistic considerations with the assessment of epidemiological studies in 
3 However, there may have been some undisclosed mechanistic reasoning. See §4 on this point.
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order to obtain an overall assessment of a claim about disease causation. However, this inte-
gration can be rather haphazard. To give an example, reviews that assessed whether Zika vi-
rus causes birth defects considered mechanistic evidence in several different ways (William-
son, 2018). Frank et al. (2016) used the well-known Hill indicators of causality to assess 
teratogenicity (see Table 1): these indicators include ‘Plausibility’ and ‘Coherence’ which 
assess fit of the causal claim to mechanistic considerations. Rasmussen et al. (2016), on the 
other hand, used Shepard’s indicators, which are tailored specifically to the assessment of 
teratogenicity and which include a single indicator that considers fit to established mech-
anisms. Meanwhile Krauer et al. (2017) used an ad-hoc set of indicators, which included 
biological plausibility. None of these systems specifies exactly how the various indicators 
combine and different reviews came to different conclusions about teratogenicity. In sum, 
then, while these reviews do support the claim that the routine assessment of mechanistic 
consideration is feasible, they are far from exemplars of the full EBM+ programme, which 
seeks a more systematic integration of evidence.
Figure 2
Evidential relationships for IARC’s evaluations (Williamson, 2019b)
Exposure assessment
The assessment of the effects of exposures provides a more fruitful hunting ground for ev-
idence of the feasibility of EBM+. In particular, the new (2019) methods of the Interna-
tional Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) for evaluating the carcinogenicity of vari-
ous agents, presented in IARC (2019a) and Samet et al. (2019), are very much in line with 
EBM+. Fig. 2 provides an EBM+-style conceptualisation of the evidential relationships in 
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IARC’s procedure. IARC separately assesses exposure studies, human studies, animal stud-
ies and mechanistic studies and then integrates these assessments to come up with an over-
all evaluation of carcinogenicity. Human studies encompass epidemiological studies on hu-
mans; these provide direct evidence of correlation and indirect evidence of the existence 
of a mechanism of action, as portrayed in Fig. 1. Similarly, mechanistic studies are used to 
directly test specific mechanism hypotheses: IARC have developed a list of ten key charac-
teristics of carcinogens and mechanistic studies are used to determine which of these char-
acteristics, if any, is present in mechanisms involving the agent in question. Additionally, 
animal studies provide indirect evidence of both correlation and mechanism in humans, as 
long as the relevant animal and human mechanisms are sufficiently similar—a judgement 
that is informed by mechanistic studies (Wilde and Parkkinen, 2019).
As a recent example of the procedural aspects of IARC evaluations, consider the eval-
uation of the carcinogenicity of three chemicals, namely styrene, styrene-7-8-oxide and 
quinolene, which took place on 20-27 March 2018 and which culminated in the mono-
graph IARC (2019b). Including those responsible for the evaluation, members of IARC 
who assisted the evaluation, and invited specialists, the subgroup charged with analysing 
exposure data had 6 members, the subgroup assessing human studies had 10 members, 
that assessing animal studies had 4 members, and that assessing mechanistic studies had 
15  members. The size of each subgroup reflects the range of expertise required for that 
component of the evaluation. Before the evaluation meeting, roughly a year’s preparation 
went into organising the meeting, selecting the studies for review, and producing an ini-
tial review of the material by the working group members. At the review meeting itself, the 
subgroups met separately for the first four days in order to assess the evidence in their cate-
gory for each of the three chemicals. All subgroups then came together to integrate the in-
dividual assessments and generate an overall evaluation of the carcinogenicity of each of 
the three chemicals—this phase of the procedure took approximately three days. After the 
meeting, participants worked for over a year to finalise the resulting publication of the as-
sessment, IARC (2019b). This gives an indication of the scale of the enterprise. That it is 
feasible and reliable is witnessed by the fact that IARC has conducted over a thousand eval-
uations to date, and that IARC evaluations are relied on around the world to influence 
public health policies that restrict exposure to carcinogens.
That IARC evaluations are broadly in line with EBM+ procedure can also be seen 
with the aid of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, which characterise the EBM+ approach to evaluating ef-
ficacy and external validity respectively. In the context of an IARC evaluation, the effi-
cacy question asks whether the agent under review is a cause of cancer in humans, while 
the external validity question asks whether the conclusions from animal studies extrapo-
late to humans. Consider Fig. 3 first. If human studies suffice to establish or rule out carci-
no-genicity, then, according to IARC procedure, carcinogenicity is decided and the results 
of the assessment of mechanistic studies do not bear on the overall evaluation. Otherwise, 
the IARC classification of carcinogenicity is influenced by their assessment of specific 
mechanistic hypotheses—the 10 key characteristics of carcinogens—and their systemic re-
view of mechanistic studies that are relevant to these hypotheses. The subgroup responsible 
for assessing mechanistic studies then assesses whether these characteristics are present and 
whether there is strong mechanistic evidence overall, i.e., whether there is strong evidence 
arising from mechanistic studies for the claim that there is a mechanism of action. Thus far, 
IARC procedure is perfectly in line with EBM+. EBM+ then sugests that one should ex-
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plicitly consider whether human and animal studies provide strong indirect evidence that 
there is a mechanism of action, in order to determine the status of the general mechanis-
tic claim, and that the status of the overall carcinogenicity claim tracks the status of which-
ever of the correlation and mechanism claims is weaker. It is here that IARC procedure de-
parts slightly from that of EBM+ (Parkkinen et al., 2018, Chapter 8): IARC’s method for 
determining the overall evaluation is rather more intricate, and, according to Williamson 
(2019b), has certain limitations. Despite these minor differences, IARC procedure is very 
close to that of EBM+. Fig. 4 tells a similar story: for IARC, the role of animal studies de-
pends on how decisive they are in determining carcinogenicity in the experimental animals 
and how similar the putative mechanisms of action are in animals and humans, which is in 
accord with the EBM+ approach of Fig. 4.
Figure 3
EBM+ procedure for assessing efficacy (Parkkinen et al., 2018, §3.3)
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Figure 4
EBM+ procedure for assessing external validity (Parkkinen et al., 2018, §3.3)
Overall, then, the feasibility of IARC procedure supports the feasibility of the EBM+ 
approach. IARC clearly show that it is possible to search for and assess mechanistic studies 
in a systematic way, and to integrate this assessment with those of epidemiological studies 
in humans and animal studies to determine an overall evaluation. All this requires effort: 
a working group tasked with assessing mechanistic evidence. But this effort is proportion-
ate to that expended on the assessment of human and animal studies. Furthermore, EBM+ 
procedure imposes a lower burden than IARC procedure, because EBM+ recommends a 
full evaluation of mechanistic studies only where association studies on their own fail to es-
tablish causation (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4), while IARC evaluate mechanistic studies even in 
situations where this evaluation cannot influence the overall assessment of carcinogenicity.
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To summarise, evidence of the feasibility of EBM+ is hard to find in the areas of inter-
vention assessment and disease assessment, but there is good evidence arising from IARC 
practice in exposure assessment. Although evidence of the feasibility of EBM+ is strongest 
in the area of exposure assessment, the domain of application of EBM+ is not restricted to 
exposure assessment. EBM+ offers a general methodology for assessing causation in medi-
cine, and its feasibility for exposure assessment supports its feasibility for intervention as-
sessment, disease assessment, and indeed basic medical science.
While the number and quality of relevant mechanistic studies will vary from area to area, 
IARC practice shows that, in an area where there are often very many relevant mechanistic 
studies, it is feasible to search for and assess these studies, and to integrate that assessment with 
assessments of other studies in order to determine the overall status of a causal claim of interest.
That EBM+ is feasible in exposure assessment carries directly over to disease assess-
ment. Of course, diseases caused by infectious agents rather than chemical exposures re-
quire considering studies of mechanisms of infection and of the body’s defences against 
infection, rather than studies of metabolism of chemicals and the effects of resulting me-
tabolites. However, IARC already routinely considers infectious causes of cancer, and no 
new feasibility concerns arise there.
Let us turn next to intervention assessment. Intervention assessment differs from dis-
ease assessment insofar as experimental studies become more practical when assessing the 
effects of an intervention. This complicates the evaluation of association studies. However, 
it does not significantly complicate the evaluation of mechanistic studies. One will often 
need to consider mechanisms of compliance with the intervention in addition to the mech-
anism of action of the intervention and any counteracting mechanisms. However, mecha-
nisms of compliance are analogous to mechanisms of exposure in exposure assessment, and 
these are routinely considered in some detail by IARC, for example, so no new concerns 
about feasibility emerge.
Thus the feasibility of IARC assessments supports the feasibility of EBM+ in both dis-
ease and intervention assessment, in addition to exposure assessment.
3. The malleability of EBM+
Stegenga (2018) argues forcefully that the methods of present-day EBM are malleable, 
in the sense that their implementation requires many subjective choices and this makes 
their results prone to influence by interested parties. The worry arises that the methods of 
EBM+, which require the assessment of mechanistic studies in addition to the assessment 
of association studies mandated by EBM, will be even more malleable. If so, its malleability 
would be a serious objection to EBM+.4
Stegenga argues that the malleability of present-day EBM stems from a range of prob-
lems with association studies which leave them open to bias and fraud. The aim of this sec-
4 Howick (2019, p. 178), for example, expresses concerns about malleability. He criticises EBM+ for 
not focussing on the problem of financial biases, saying, ‘by ignoring the problem, they cannot possi-
bly solve it.’ The extensive literature on values in science reinforces concerns about malleability—see 
Douglas (2009); Teira and Reiss (2013); Andreoletti and Teira (2019) and Holman (2019) for exam-
ple. Gillies (2019a) responds to Holman’s concerns about EBM+.
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tion is not to defend EBM from these criticisms, but to investigate whether EBM+ is more 
or less prone to malleability than EBM. Our approach will again to be to consider various 
possible responses to this objection, in order to determine whether EBM+ can offer a via-
ble defence.
Formalisation
One might attempt to respond to the malleability worry by developing a formal framework 
for EBM+, in the hope that formalisation reduces the scope for subjective influence. That 
this is not a promising strategy, however, can be seen from efforts to formalise Hill’s indi-
cators of causality, depicted in Table 1. As we saw above, Hill’s approach takes mechanistic 
considerations into account, but Hill does not specify exactly how to tell when an indicator 
is present, nor how to integrate evidence arising from multiple indicators (Hill, 1965), leav-
ing his approach open to the charge of malleability. There have been some interesting at-
tempts to formalise Hill’s approach in order to reduce malleability.
Figure 5
The Bayesian network formalisation of Hill’s indicators of Landes et al. (2018)
One line of work here is the E-synthesis approach of Landes et al. (2018), which for-
malises Hill’s indicators by means of the Bayesian network framework. Fig. 5 represents the 
graph of such a network. The node at the top refers to the causal hypothesis. At the next 
level down there are variables related to Hill’s indicators: ∆ refers to difference making, PD 
to probabilistic dependence, DR to dose-response relationship, RoG to rate of growth, M 
to mechanisms, T to temporality, and so on. Each indicator is connected to an evidence re-
port (REP) variable for every item of evidence that bears on that indicator (although only 
one such variable for each indicator is depicted in Fig. 5). Each evidence report variable is 
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in turn connected to two further variables denoting the relevance, RLV, and reliability, 
REL, of that evidence report. A Bayesian network also requires the probability distribution 
of each variable conditional on its parent variables in the graph. These, according to Landes 
et al. (2018, p. 33), should be based on domain knowledge elicited from experts. It is here 
that the malleability problem emerges. Domain knowledge is very unlikely to fully deter-
mine all these probability parameters, and decisions will need to be made as to how to fill 
in the gaps. Bias and fraud can enter the picture here, and will be all the harder to detect be-
cause of the complexity of the formal framework. One might attempt to elicit the probabil-
ity distributions themselves from experts, but this is a big ask. Moreover, different experts 
are likely to provide very different probability distributions, because experts have radically 
differing views about the relative importance of Hill’s indicators, and because many varia-
bles denote epistemological qualities—reliability and relevance—which domain experts are 
not used to quantifying. Hence, regardless of the merits of the E-synthesis approach, there 
remains plenty of scope for subjective influence and this approach is unlikely to help with 
the specific problem of malleability.
Swaen and van Amelsvoort (2009) also attempt to formalise Hill’s indicators in order 
to reduce the influence of subjectivity when deciding how the various indicators should 
be weighed. They appeal to a ‘weight-of-evidence’ approach (Weed, 2005), which requires 
quantifying the extent to which each of Hill’s indicators is met and quantifying the relative 
importance of each indicator. Instead of eliciting these weights from experts, which would 
be susceptible to the objections offered above, Swaen and van Amelsvoort (2009) try to 
learn the parameters of the model from a dataset consisting of past IARC evaluations of 
the carcinogenicity of various exposures. The problem with this approach is that their as-
sessment of the extent to which past IARC classifications exhibit each of Hill’s indicators 
is rather arbitrary—certainly there is room for subjective disagreement there. Moreover, it 
is not clear how the resulting model can be reliably extrapolated to future IARC classifica-
tions, let alone to the assessment of interventions. This is because certain model assump-
tions appear very questionable: for example, it is assumed that weights of indicators com-
bine linearly and do not vary from context to context.
Thus formalisation offers little scope for ameliorating malleability. Whether one at-
tempts to elicit model parameters from experts or to learn them from data, subjective 
judgements play an important role. Introducing strong model assumptions offers one way 
of reducing the number of free parameters that are open to subjective influence. However, 
this tactic merely threatens to trade malleability for unreliability, and in any case, model as-
sumptions are themselves open to disagreement.
Quantity of evidence
A more promising response to the malleability objection notes that increasing the quan-
tity of evidence tends to reduce subjective influence. The general idea is that if evidence E 
makes some set CE of conclusions rationally permissible, where different subjective choices 
along the way can lead to different conclusions, then additional evidence F is likely to lead 
to a smaller, rather than larger, set CEF of rationally permissible conclusions. In our context, 
the conclusions relate to a proposition of the form A is a cause of B. If we take E to be evi-
dence from association studies and F evidence from mechanistic studies, this phenomenon 
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sugests that the influence of subjectivity is likely to be reduced, rather than increased, by 
taking mechanistic studies into account.
In a Bayesian framework, where CE might represent a set of rationally permissible de-
grees of belief in the proposition that A is a cause of B, this phenomenon is called the 
‘washing-out of priors’ and is made precise by means of a range of convergence-of-opinion 
theorems (see, e.g., Dorling, 1975, §11; Dorling and Edgington, 1976). Under certain con-
ditions, one can guarantee that a set of rational degrees of belief will converge to a single 
rational degree of belief as the quantity of evidence increases. However, these conditions 
are somewhat idealistic and there is room for debate about the extent to which they are 
met in practice (Earman, 1992, Chapter 6). Moreover, even if they are met, they provide 
no guarantee that the influence of subjectivity will reduce in the short term. Indeed, there 
are many intriguing cases of ‘dilation’, where learning something new can enlarge the set of 
permissible degrees of belief.5
Regardless of these challenges, there must be something of substance to the general 
phenomenon, for otherwise there would be no advantage to gathering more evidence. 
The upshot is that one should expect EBM+ to reduce, rather than increase, malleabil-
ity, in comparison to EBM. To suggest otherwise would require some reason for thinking 
that mechanistic and association studies together are particularly likely to lead to dilation. 
However, the opposite appears to be the case, as we shall now see.
Variety of evidence
An even more promising response to the malleability objection appeals to the potential for 
diverse evidence to reduce subjective influence.6 As noted above, causal inference is beset 
by the problem that an observed correlation has a wide range of potential explanations, in-
cluding bias and confounding, and that one can only establish causation where these other 
potential explanations can be ruled out. Association studies can provide some evidence 
against these alternative explanations. But, as Stegenga argues, association studies are prone 
to error and bias and are malleable. The standard view is that where the existing association 
studies are inconclusive, more association studies are called for. However, further associa-
tion studies are prone to the same kinds of errors, biases and malleability as the original as-
sociation studies. Just as independent witnesses are given more weight than witnesses with 
common interests and similar flaws, studies with different designs and carried out by teams 
with different interests would be more helpful.
Mechanistic studies are just such studies. Mechanistic studies tend to be much more 
heterogeneous than association studies and typically involve methods other than those 
used by association studies, such as in vitro lab work, biomedical imaging, autopsies, ani-
mal experiments and simulations. Defects of these different kinds of study are independent 
of defects of association studies and of each other. They are often conducted by research 
teams with different interests to those who carry out association studies (which tend to be 
carried out by drug companies seeking approval for lucrative new drugs). Thus publication 
5 See Zhang et al. (2018) for a recent discussion of the relation between dilation and disagreement.
6 Again, there are Bayesian explications of this phenomenon (e.g., Landes, 2020), but again, there are ex-
ceptions to the general phenomenon.
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bias, fraud, and industry manipulation are less of a concern for mechanistic studies than for 
association studies. To be sure, the teams carrying out mechanistic studies do have inter-
ests, but these interests tend to differ.7
To some extent, then, association studies and mechanistic studies act as independent 
witnesses—certainly more so than do association studies and yet more association studies. 
Scrutinising and evaluating both kinds of study can only help to diminish the scope of mal-
leability and error.
Reinforcing evidence
While the quantity- and variety-of-evidence responses go some way towards addressing 
concerns about malleability, more can be said. There is an important sense in which associ-
ation studies and mechanistic studies have complementary strengths. As we have observed, 
association studies on their own can be unreliable indicators of causality because of biases, 
unforeseen confounding etc. Mechanistic studies help to address precisely these deficien-
cies: they tell us about potential confounders and help to determine whether a correlation 
is genuinely causal. On the other hand, mechanistic studies on their own can be unreliable 
indicators of causality in two ways: (i) it can be hard to determine from a complex mech-
anism whether the putative cause actually makes a difference to the putative effect (the 
‘problem of complexity’); (ii) there may be unforeseen counteracting mechanisms which 
cancel out the influence of some positive mechanism of action (the ‘problem of masking’). 
Association studies ameliorate both these problems: (i) they can be used to demonstrate 
the existence of a net association across the mechanism as a whole, showing that the cause 
does make a difference to the effect; (ii) a positive association provides evidence that un-
foreseen counteracting mechanisms do not fully cancel out the mechanism of action.
Thus association studies and mechanistic studies are not fully independent witnesses: 
they are better than independent witnesses, because they make up for one another’s defi-
ciencies. From an epistemological point of view, association studies and mechanistic studies 
reinforce each other—their combined evidential value is more than the sum of the parts. 
The case study of Auker-Howlett and Wilde (2019), discussed above, shows this reinforc-
ing in action. This epistemological reinforcing can be expected to further reduce the influ-
ence of subjectivity.
Practice
So far, we have seen that formalisation offers little scope for addressing malleability, but 
that we should nevertheless expect EBM+ to be less prone to malleability than EBM be-
cause association and mechanistic studies offer a greater quantity and variety of evidence 
and they reinforce one another. Actual practice supports this claim. Abdin et  al. (2019) 
consider evaluations of amoxicillin as a cause of drug reaction with eosinophilia and sys-
temic symptoms (DRESS). This is a case in which considering mechanistic studies offers 
7 This is of course not to say that interests never coincide, nor that bias, fraud and industry manipula-
tion are never a concern for mechanistic studies. See Fugh-Berman (2013); Green (2015) and Conradi 
and Joffe (2017) on this point.
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to be particularly promising: there is too little evidence from association studies for an in-
formative EBM evaluation, because these adverse drug reactions are extremely rare and can 
take many years to materialise. The authors apply both the EBM+ approach and the E-syn-
thesis approach that we encountered above. They demonstrate inter-tool agreement: they 
show that the two approaches yield similar conclusions, namely that mechanistic evidence 
lends further support to the claim that amoxicillin is a cause of DRESS, but not enough 
support to establish the claim.
We have already seen that IARC’s current approach to evaluation is very close to the 
EBM+ approach. Anecdotally at least, there seems to be little inter-assessor variability in 
assessments of mechanistic studies carried out by the mechanistic subgroup of an IARC 
evaluation. There is certainly no evidence that subjectivity has a significant influence on 
overall evaluations. Simple structural features of IARC’s methodology help to avoid mal-
leability. Firstly, potential financial conflicts of interest are taken very seriously. (It some-
times happens that an assessor is removed from a working group in the middle of a review 
meeting, when a potential conflict of interest is found.) Second, scientists are not permit-
ted to evaluate their own studies, so there is less scope for intellectual conflicts of interest 
to influence proceedings. Third, the IARC secretariat work very hard to ensure consistency 
across evaluations, by ensuring that assessors are aware of normal standards by which judge-
ments of strength of evidence are made, and by adopting a very formulaic procedure for in-
tegrating subgroup assessments in order to converge upon an overall assessment of carcino-
genicity. Malleability is kept in check in practice.8
Malleability is an understandable worry, given problems faced by EBM in the assess-
ment of association studies. However, we have seen that there are several good reasons for 
thinking that a move to EBM+ will mitigate, rather than amplify, the effects of subjective 
choices during the assessment procedure.9 While more clearly needs to be done to test for 
malleability in EBM+, concerns about malleability are certainly not grounds for choosing 
EBM over EBM+.
4. Discussion
We have seen that EBM+ can be defended against two charges: that is it unfeasible and 
that it is malleable.
While there is limited evidence of feasibility in the areas of intervention and disease as-
sessment, there is good evidence of feasibility arising from IARC practice in exposure as-
sessment. Moreover, the feasibility of EBM+ in one area of practice supports its feasibility 
in other areas: assessing causality is a general problem that transcends these rather arbitrary 
8 Far from being malleable, Williamson (2019b) argues that, if anything, IARC evaluations are not flexi-
ble enough to cope with exceptional cases.
9 Recall that Howick (2019, p. 178) criticises EBM+ for not focussing on the problem of financial bi-
ases. We have seen above that the diversity of evidence considered by EBM+ helps to ameliorate this 
problem. Coupling that progress with a healthy scepticism towards research carried out by research-
ers or organisations with potential financial conflicts of interest, and a strategy for avoiding evidence 
appraisers with potential financial conflicts of interest, goes a long way towards solving the problem. 
Thus EBM+ is on a better footing than EBM with respect to financial biases.
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distinctions between kinds of practice. Indeed, the lessons learned here apply beyond medi-
cine. For example, Shan and Williamson (2021) argue that the basic epistemological frame-
work underpinning EBM+, namely a particular form of epistemological pluralism, can also 
be applied to the social sciences, including to evidence-based policy (EBP), which leads to 
EBP+, and to basic social sciences research, where the framework can be viewed as provid-
ing foundations for mixed methods research.
With regard to malleability, we have seen that there are general epistemological reasons 
for thinking that subjective influences are likely to be diminished by considering mecha-
nistic studies alongside association studies, and that actual practice sugests that malleabil-
ity is not a substantial problem for EBM+. (Again, the general epistemological considera-
tions carry over to the social sciences.) This is not to sugest that EBM+ eradicates the need 
for personal judgement—judgements of quality of study, for example, are required by both 
EBM and EBM+. The claim is that by considering mechanistic studies in addition to as-
sociation studies, one has more evidence to go on, more varied evidence, and evidence that 
makes up for the deficiencies of other evidence, so there is less scope for any malleability 
with respect to individual judgements to influence the final assessment of causality.
Stegenga (2018) appeals to the malleability of EBM to argue for medical nihilism: 
the claim that almost all medical interventions are ineffective. His argument can be put 
roughly as follows: medical interventions are approved on the basis of EBM assessments; 
EBM assessments are riddled with problems, such as malleability, which weaken the link 
between effectiveness and approval; so we should have low confidence that an approved 
medical intervention is effective.
What should we make of Stegenga’s argument? At least two considerations urge cau-
tion. First, Stegenga appeals to Bayesianism to formalise his argument. Now, as we have 
seen, Bayesian explications of scientific confirmation are themselves prone to malleabil-
ity: one can easily take issue with Stegenga’s claims about the probabilities that feature in 
his explication and reach different conclusions, as Gillies (2019b) explains. Thus there is a 
sense in which Stegenga’s focus on malleability is self-undermining.
Second, one can take issue with the first premise of Stegenga’s argument: that medical 
interventions are approved on the basis of EBM assessments. Certainly, intervention ap-
proval panels almost always claim to come to their judgements by means of the methods 
of present-day EBM. Certainly, the methods of present-day EBM—especially the assess-
ment of RCTs and meta-analyses and systematic reviews of RCTs—inform their judge-
ments. But their judgements tend not to wholly comply with the principles of present-day 
EBM. Typically, analyses of RCTs, meta-analyses and systematic reviews are presented to 
approval panels, and then a general informal discussion ensues—a discussion which often 
encompasses mechanisms of action, compliance and adverse effects—before a judgement 
is made. Panel members give opinions about the plausibility of the underlying mechanisms, 
and this plausibility informs the resulting judgement about whether the intervention 
should be approved. This part of the process does not accord with EBM, which, as we 
noted in §1, holds that mechanistic reasoning and expert opinion should be given little or 
no weight in comparison to RCTs. So the approval process does not altogether follow the 
precepts of EBM.
That intervention approval departs from the precepts of EBM undermines Stegen-
ga’s argument for medical nihilism. This is because the point of departure is with regard 
to mechanistic hypotheses, and this shifts the approval process in the direction of EBM+. 
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21244 207
The feasibility and malleability of EBM+
That in practice approval panels explicitly evaluate association studies and consider mech-
anistic hypotheses in an implicit, common-sensical way lends some confidence to the pro-
cess, because it is a step in the direction of EBM+. In order to cast doubt on the approval 
process, Stegenga would need to undermine what takes place in practice, i.e., this com-
mon-sensical hybrid, which we might call EBM±.
This is not to put the approval process beyond criticism. It would obviously be better 
if, instead of an informal discussion of mechanisms guided by the expertise and interests 
of the panel members who happen to be on the panel, mechanistic evidence were system-
atically scrutinised and its assessment systematically integrated with that of correlational 
evidence. As we saw in §1, the guiding principle underlying both EBM and EBM+ is that 
it is largely by making the evidence and the appraisal process explicit and systematic that 
one can improve the reliability of resulting judgements; there is clearly much more to be 
done here with respect to the practice of intervention approval.10 However, the further one 
moves towards EBM+, the more confidence one can have in judgements made on the basis 
of evidence appraisals.
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